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Visceral afferent signals to the brain influence thoughts, feelings and behavior. Here we
highlight the findings of a set of empirical investigations in humans concerning body-mind
interaction that focus on how feedback from states of autonomic arousal shapes
cognition and emotion. There is a longstanding debate regarding the contribution of
the body to mental processes. Recent theoretical models broadly acknowledge the role
of (autonomically-mediated) physiological arousal to emotional, social and motivational
behaviors, yet the underlying mechanisms are only partially characterized. Neuroimaging
is overcoming this shortfall; first, by demonstrating correlations between autonomic
change and discrete patterns of evoked, and task-independent, neural activity; second,
by mapping the central consequences of clinical perturbations in autonomic response
and; third, by probing how dynamic fluctuations in peripheral autonomic state are
integrated with perceptual, cognitive and emotional processes. Building on the notion
that an important source of the brain’s representation of physiological arousal is derived
from afferent information from arterial baroreceptors, we have exploited the phasic
nature of these signals to show their differential contribution to the processing of
emotionally-salient stimuli. This recent work highlights the facilitation at neural and
behavioral levels of fear and threat processing that contrasts with the more established
observations of the inhibition of central pain processing during baroreceptors activation.
The implications of this body-brain-mind axis are discussed.
Keywords: anxiety, arousal, autonomic, baroreceptor, cardiac cycle, emotion, neuroimaging, interoception
Overview
Neuroimaging, notably using nuclear magnetic resonance imaging, has transformed human
neuroscience over the last 20 years. Functional neuroimaging enables non-invasive in vivo
evaluation of brain regions and networks supporting perceptions thoughts, feelings and continues
to provide profound insight into normative brain mechanisms and functions. Neuroimaging
findings have great translational potential, but so far clinical imaging biomarkers are largely limited
to neurodegenerative conditions. Within autonomic neuroscience, the full impact of neuroimaging
has yet to be realized. Arguably, the field has been restrained by technical challenges, for example
in combining functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) with detailed autonomic recording
or associated experimental manipulations. However, such difficulties can and have been overcome
(Gray et al., 2009a). Perhaps as relevant is a historical cultural stance that has rather underplayed
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the integration, across the neuraxis, of dynamic autonomic
control and its contribution to perceptual, cognitive,
motivational and volitional processes. This stance is increasingly
challenged by neuroscientific findings and the pragmatics of
therapeutic interventions. Here we review an area of autonomic
neuroscience that combines human behavioral studies and
neuroimaging to characterize the interaction between visceral
physiology, perception and affect.
Historical Background
The contribution of bodily arousal to thoughts and feelings has
been debated for many centuries. The classical Greek physician
Hippocrates and his followers, seemingly arguing against an
existing doctrine, proposed that the
“..source of our pleasure, merriment, laughter and amusement,
as of our grief, pain, anxiety and tears, is none other than the
brain. . . .(it) enables us to think, see and hear, and to distinguish
the ugly and the beautiful, the bad and the good, pleasant and
unpleasant. . . diaphragm nor heart.. neither take part in mental
operations” (Hippocrates 400 BCE)1
Relatively soon afterwards a distinct, extreme alternative is
attributed to Aristotle:
“..the brain is not responsible for any of the sensations.. the correct
view [is] that the seat and source of sensation is the region of
the heart. . . .the motions of pleasure and pain, and generally all
sensation plainly have their source in the heart..” (Aristotle 350
BCE) 2
Despite Aristotelian dominance over Western European
(church-led) thought, the brain re-emerged as in the distinction
between “hot” passion and “cold” reason. With Descartes,
the body (including the brain) was further distanced from
cognitions, and seemingly it was not until Darwin systematically
highlighted the commonalities across species in the physical,
physiological and behavioral expression of emotions that the
link between bodily states and emotional feelings was established
once again in psychological thinking (Darwin, 1872). At the
turn of the nineteenth century, William James and Carl Lange
both argued, with some differences, that emotional feeling states
originated in physiological responses in the body:
“..that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the
exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur
is the emotion.” (James, 1884)
Lange in particular attributed both positive and negative
emotions to visceral vasomotor reactions (Lange, 1885/1912).
Over the course of the twentieth century, there followed a series
of evaluations and critiques of physiological accounts of emotion,
including, for example, quantifying emotional effects of parentral
adrenaline administration, fromMaranon and Cantril and Hunt,
to Schacter and Singer (Maranon, 1924; Cantril and Hunt, 1932;
1Hippocrates. 400 BCE. On the Sacred Disease.
2Aristotle. 350 BCE. Parts of Animals.
Schachter and Singer, 1962). Schachter and Singer’s two stage
model of emotion, followed Walter Cannon’s dismissal of the
contribution of peripheral physiology to emotional experience
as epiphenomenological (Cannon, 1927, 1931). Schachter and
Singer’s model represented a compromise that acknowledged a
primary, yet non-specific contribution of physiological arousal to
emotions, shaped into and labeled as particular emotion types by
cognitive and social expectations (Schachter and Singer, 1962).
Over subsequent years, physiology has featured in a number of
major models of emotion, such as labeled line (which incorporate
dedicated function-specific processing architecture) (e.g., Ekman
et al., 1983; LeDoux, 2000) and constructivist models of emotion
(which argue that emotions are not modular phenomena, but
are instead constructed from psychological influences) (e.g.,
Damasio, 1999; Barrett, 2006).
Our own laboratory has attempted to combine cognitive
neuroscience with clinical autonomic research, initially to
test ideas put forward by Damasio and colleagues (Damasio
et al., 1991; Bechara et al., 1997; Bechara and Damasio, 2005)
concerning the influence of peripheral physiological states on
decisions, thoughts and feelings. These studies combined
functional neuroimaging (first using positron emission
tomography, PET, then magnetic resonance imaging) with
monitoring of autonomic responses evoked by performance
of cognitive emotional or effortful tasks (Critchley et al.,
2000a,b, 2005a,b). Across experiments, a characteristic pattern
of activity was associated with states of psycho-physiological
arousal, generally irrespective of whether the participants
were processing salient emotional information or performing
demanding cognitive or effortful motor tasks. Such challenges
commonly evoke an enhancement of activity within dorsal
anterior cingulate cortex (extending caudally to mid cingulate)
accompanied by bilateral mid to anterior insular cortex activity.
Activity in these areas typically correlate with autonomic
change; shifts in sympathovagal balance (toward sympathetic
arousal and parasympathetic withdrawal) whether measured
by electrodermal activity, changes in pupil size, heart rate
acceleration or heart rate variability (Critchley et al., 2002,
2003, 2005a,b). This coupling of motivational behavior with
adaptive changes in bodily-state provides an integrative account
of why certain regions process both mental and physiological
information. For example, regions such as “cognitive” anterior
cingulate activate when both mental and physiological resources
are diverted to meet behavioral challenges. Observed attenuation
of sympathetic arousal in patients with lesions affecting dorsal
anterior/mid cingulate (Tranel, 2000) during motor and
cognitive effort further supports the notion that rostromedial
cortex hosts a visceromotor center that drives action-ready
autonomic states during psychological arousal. Interestingly, the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex and subgenual cingulate region
appears, across a number of experiments, to be “antisympathetic”
and/or parasympathetic: For example, the tonic level of
sympathetic electrodermal arousal is negatively correlated with
activity within this region (Nagai et al., 2004) (Figure 1), and
correspondingly, correlations between high frequency heart
rate variability (an index of parasympathetic cardiac control)
and ventromedial prefrontal cortical activity are also observed.
In an elegant illustration, Wager and colleagues showed that
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FIGURE 1 | Neural activity reflecting reducing tonic level of
sympathetic electrodermal arousal. The figure panels illustrate
data presented from Nagai et al. (2004). (A) Decreases in skin
conductance level were associated with increased activity in the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex and orbitofrontal cortex this effect
was independent of task in that they occurred irrespective of
whether participants performed a biofeedback arousal or a
biofeedback relaxation task. (B) Across all participants, activity within
the subgenual cingulate region was associated with decreases in
tonic skin conductance level.
increases in heart rate induced by the stress of “social evaluation”
are independently predicted by increased activity within dorsal
anterior cingulate and decreased activity within ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (Wager et al., 2009). In contrast to anterior
cingulate cortex, across different studies evidence points to a role
of insular cortex in representing (mapping) states of autonomic
arousal and visceral change (Critchley et al., 2004; Pollatos et al.,
2007).
A core aspect to stress-induced physiological arousal is the
suppression of the normal baroreflex response, to allow heart
rate and blood pressure to rise together. During experimental
induction of psychological stress, activity within dorsal cingulate,
bilateral insula, amygdala and dorsal brainstem (midbrain
periaqueductal gray matter) predicted the magnitude of beat-
by-beat baroreflex suppression (Gianaros et al., 2012). It is
noteworthy that each of these regions is implicated, indicating
that dynamic interaction between afferent and efferent axes
of autonomic control extend beyond brainstem to forebrain
(both subcortical and cortical) centers. The contribution of
afferent autonomic feedback to the expression of physiological
arousal in emotion is consistent with the observed neural
correlates of mental stress. Both insular cortex and amygdala
are sensitive to the presence of threat-induced autonomic
responses: In a fear conditioning study that compared patients
with autonomic failure to healthy controls, the absence of
an autonomic response to threat stimuli was associated with
attenuated activity within amygdala and mid insula. Insular
cortical responses, in both mid and right anterior regions,
were observed to reflect the further integration of physiological
feedback with the conscious processing of threat stimuli,
achieved experimentally by comparing responses to supraliminal
and subliminal conditioned threat stimuli between autonomic
failure and control participants (Critchley et al., 2002). While
the amygdala is a key region thought to reflect fear/threat,
emotion, and general salience (Santos et al., 2011), its apparent
“activation” when monitored using fMRI can be subject to
potential confounds derived from a venous origin (Boubela et al.,
2015). Moreover, the experience of fear can be experienced in the
absence of amygdala activation, as demonstrated via inhalation of
35% CO2 in patients with bilateral amygdala damage (Feinstein
et al., 2013). Together these studies highlight a need to review
past amygdala lesion and activation studies with respect to
interpreting it as an obligatory substrate for emotions.
The general observation that, in health, subliminal threat
stimuli can evoke physiological arousal responses provides
support for the automatic primacy of bodily responses to
emotional experience. Such evidence is very relevant to
peripheral theories of emotion, where the feedback of bodily
response is proposed to be the basis for emotional feelings
(Lange and James, 1967), in contrast to a common process
generating feelings and physiological change. The information
fed back from the automatic bodily response can then guide
perceptions and decisions as “somatic markers” (Damasio
et al., 1991; Bechara et al., 1997; Bechara and Damasio, 2005).
Within this theme, Katkin and colleagues conducted a study
where participants were subliminally presented (using backward
masking) two stimuli, one of which predicted the occurrence
of a later shock. At each trial, during a delay following
the stimulus presentation, the participant was asked to judge
whether they thought they would receive a shock. Without
conscious awareness to enable discrimination between the
stimuli, participants should have, in theory, performed at chance
on this “trace conditioning” task. However, it was observed
that some individuals, preselected as being “interoceptively
aware” based on their accurate performance on a heartbeat
detection task, were able to estimate well above chance whether
a subliminal stimulus was paired with a later shock (Katkin
et al., 2001). The interpretation was that those individuals
most sensitive to their bodily responses, i.e., able to access the
arousal responses generated automatically by the subliminal
threat, could effectively use that information in their decision-
making.
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Interoceptive Ability
The measurement of individual differences in interoceptive
sensitivity/accuracy has over the years gravitated toward
heartbeat detections tasks. Correlations with other axes of
interoception (e.g., gastric filling) have reassured people that
the ability to perceive individual heartbeats at rest can lead
to inferences about an individual’s more general sensitivity
to internal bodily responses and arguably, by extension, their
impact on emotional processes. Heartbeat detection tasks include
the “Schandry task”: counting heartbeats at rest over a fixed
interval (comparing reported to actual number of heartbeats
measured using electrocardiography) (Schandry, 1981) and
the Whitehead/Katkin task where people judge the timing
(synchronous or delayed) of external auditory or visual stimuli
relative to the heart beats that triggered the stimuli (Whitehead
et al., 1977; Katkin et al., 1983; Wiens and Palmer, 2001).
Neuroimaging studies (Critchley et al., 2004; Pollatos et al.,
2007) associate performance on heartbeat detection tasks with
engagement of right insular cortex in particular as part of a
wider network of regions including anterior cingulate cortex
(Medford and Critchley, 2010). These studies confirm a role for
insula engagement in interoceptive processing, providing further
insight into how emotional feeling states especially of anxiety, are
supported within interoceptive representations (Critchley et al.,
2004; Paulus and Stein, 2006). Interestingly, the response of
part of right anterior insula differed during a Whitehead/Katkin
task, both according to whether participants’ attention is focused
“interoceptively” on their heartbeats or exteroceptively only on
the quality of the auditory stimuli, and according to the timing of
the external stimulus (presence or absence of a delay relative to
heartbeat) (Critchley et al., 2004) (see Figure 2). This interaction
suggests, at least for right anterior insular cortex, that there is
a fine-grained integration of external sensory information with
representation of individual heartbeats. Anterior insular cortex
therefore responded to mismatched timing between internal and
external signals.
Insula and Detection of Interoceptive
Mismatch
Peripheral theories of emotion superficially appear to
predict that interoceptive sensitivity would be associated
with enhanced emotional responsivity and correspondingly
increased vulnerability to emotional disorders, including
clinical anxiety. While “good heartbeat detectors” may be over
represented among anxiety patients, interceptive accuracy does
not account sufficiently. Attention to, appraisal and expectation
of physiological arousal states interact with awareness to fuel
symptoms such as anxiety (Clark, 1986; Wild et al., 2008;
Paulus and Stein, 2010; Garfinkel et al., 2015). Contrasting
the effects of false and true physiological (heartbeat) feedback
during an MRI study, Gray and colleagues (Gray et al., 2007)
showed that processing and subjective rating of neutral faces
was enhanced in the presence of false physiological arousal,
consistent with the notion that “unattributed arousal” was
assigned to an ambiguous cause: the presence of neutral
FIGURE 2 | Neural correlates for interoceptive processing. The figure
panels illustrate data presented in Critchley et al. (2004). (A) Activity in the
insula is enhanced during interoceptive attention relative to an exteroceptive
control condition (i.e., trials where attention is directed to the heart vs. trials
where attention is directed to the notes alone). (B) Neural activity reflecting the
interaction between interoceptive/exteroceptive attention (heart vs. notes) and
feedback delay (tones synchronous or delayed with respect to the heartbeat).
For delayed stimuli, activity in right insula is enhanced during interoceptive
focus and reduced during exteroceptive focus.
facial expressions. Correspondingly, intrinsically arousing
emotional faces did not show the same enhancement effect. This
behavioral effect supports the idea that unexpected physiological
arousal contributes to states of anxiety or feelings of threat
by donating salience to coincidental potential causes. In this
false feedback study, neuroimaging identified right anterior
insular cortex and amygdala activity as mediating processing of
interoceptive/exteroceptive error evoked by the false feedback to
predict the enhancement of perceived intensity of neutral faces.
These data point to the coupling of emotional states
autonomic activity and feedback via insular regions. The
processing of threat is attenuated in different in people with
absent autonomic responses who show less engagement of insula
and amygdala in response to threatening stimuli, moreover mid
and anterior region of right insula link the representation of
autonomic arousal to conscious awareness of the likely cause
of the autonomic arousal in a manner consistent with the two
stage model of emotion proposed by Schachter and Singer
(1962), wherein emotions are constructed from the interpretation
of physiological change in the concurrent cognitive context.
Individual differences in interoceptive accuracy (heartbeat
detection) influences emotional reactivity, and again the insular
cortex is the dominant substrate for accessible interoceptive
representation (Critchley et al., 2004). A major role of insula
in processing physiological change lies in the processing of the
mismatch between perceived and inferred/expected bodily state
in an attention- dependent manner. Here unattributed arousal
can alter emotional appraisal of face stimuli (via insula and
amygdala) in a manner that appears to enhance the salience and
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potentially threatening nature of “ambiguous” neutral stimuli
(Gray et al., 2007).
Baroreceptor Signaling and Cardiac Timing
In discussing the contributions of bodily physiology to the
processing of stimuli and the generation emotional feelings, there
appears at least in our view to be a primacy or dominance of
feedback of cardiovascular influences. While some autonomic
indices such as electrodermal responses or pupil size may be
sensitive indicators of emotional/affective reactions, states of
cardiovascular arousal, particularly strong fast heartbeats, are felt
as potent influences on subjective emotion. What is noteworthy
about the feedback from the heart and great vessels is that the
signal is phasic, pulsing with each heartbeat. The cardiac cycle
describes the phases of atrial and ventricular filling and discharge
of blood from the heart into the wider circulation. With each
systole, blood leaves the left ventricle into the aorta and carotids
where stretch receptors in the vessel walls (baroreceptors) are
activated. These signals are conveyed centrally to the brainstem
via the vagus and glossopharyngeal cranial nerves. Within
the medulla, these phasic signals are processed to inform
the baroreflex, whereby blood pressure is controlled by the
slowing of the heart (parasympathetic vagus) after strong heart
beats and inhibition of muscle sympathetic nerve activity to
attenuate vasoconstriction of vascular beds. Strong baroreceptor
discharges are responded to by adaptive adjustments to maintain
perfusion pressure. The same channel of afferent information
flowing from aortic/carotid sinus baroreceptors to the brain
is presumed to be the basis of heartbeat detection and the
feeling states of physiological arousal accompanying motor
and emotional behaviors. We can explore experimentally the
effects of this viscerosensory pathway on other perceptual and
mental processes without necessarily changing the overall state
of cardiovascular arousal, since baroreceptor signals occur in
bursts and are quiet between heartbeats: A brief stimulus
presented at systole is processed concurrently with aortic/carotid
baroreceptors signaling, while this is not the case for a stimulus
presented at diastole (Lacey and Lacey, 1970; Rau and Elbert,
2001).
Heartbeat Timing Experiments
There is an established body of literature that has pursued this
type of experiment, and associated theory. Broadly, the majority
of these studies indicate that stimuli presented concurrently
with baroreceptor activation (natural activation at systole) or
augmented with external neck suction) appear to be inhibited.
This is particularly the case for painful stimuli (e.g., brief
electrocutaneous shock) where there is attenuation of pain
evoked potentials, nociceptive motor and autonomic reflexes and
the perception of pain presented at the time of baroreceptor
activations relative to quiescent periods (Dworkin et al., 1994;
Rau and Elbert, 2001; Edwards et al., 2002; McIntyre et al.,
2006, 2008). Baroreceptor stimulation is reported to engender
similar blunting on stimulus processing. The observations of
Lacey and Lacey (Lacey and Lacey, 1970, 1978) with respect
to these and related cardiac cycle effects (including cardiac
deceleration in anticipation and orientation, and acceleration for
action and response) led to the formulation of a general principle
that heartbeat/baroreceptor stimulation is generally inhibitory,
perhaps representing a distracting stream of information when
one needs to survey one’s surroundings, but which can help
facilitate motor behaviors, including fight and flight responses,
in part by devaluing external distraction.
The conjunction of arterial baroreceptor activation and
external sensory stimulation has revealed some interesting
autonomic effects. For example, contrary to the notion
that sympathetic activation is a general indicator of
psychophysiological arousal, the sympathetic responses to
an arousing electrocutaneous shock at systole are distinct
between electrodermal measures and muscle sympathetic
nerve activity: the shock evokes a sympathetic skin response
(irrespective of timing in relation to baroreceptor activation) but
causes inhibition of the burst-firing of muscle sympathetic nerve
bundles (Donadio et al., 2002; Wallin, 2007). The predicted
consequence is therefore a transient drop in blood pressure.
This inhibition of muscle sympathetic nerves diminishes
through habituation if the stimulus is repeated over ensuing
systoles. Most interestingly, there is much less habituation
in blood-phobic fainters (Donadio et al., 2007), suggesting
a physiological signature underlying the propensity to faint,
wherein the interaction of interoceptive signals from the heart
with the processing of directly threatening stimuli is linked to a
stereotyped emotional behavioral reaction.
Neural Correlates of Heartbeat Timing
Effects on Sensory Processing
Certainly such observations indicate the modulatory influence
of signals from the heart and great vessels on external stimulus
processing. Moreover, the habituation effect and link to blood
phobia suggest that these mechanisms involved supratentorial
regions supporting expectation, attentional and emotion. A
neuroimaging study exploring the brain subregions supporting
interactions between electrocutaneous shock and baroreceptor
activation/heart timing combined a number of physiological
indices (including non-invasive beat-to-beat blood pressure)
with event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (Gray
et al., 2009b). Compared to timing at diastole, electrocutaneous
shocks delivered at systole were associated with a flattening of
blood pressure response which was coupled to changes in the
activity of mid pons, bilateral anterior insula, and right amygdala.
Interestingly, while this activity within pons and insula was
attenuated to stimuli presented at systole, the effect in amygdala
went in the opposite direction: blood-pressure coupled activity
in amygdala was greatest at systole (Figure 3). There was further
evidence to link these effects to baroreflex control: individual
differences in high–frequency heart rate variability (an index
of parasympathetic cardiac control) particularly predicted the
differential evoked activation of insula at systole compared to
diastole. Trial-by-trial changes in heart rate variability measure
were predicted by systole/diastole activity difference within
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FIGURE 3 | Neural activity reflecting interaction between cardiac
afferent information within cardiac cycle and electrocutaneous
shock processing. The figure panels illustrate data presented in Gray
et al. (2009b). Electrocutaneous shocks administered at cardiac systole
(around T wave of electrocardiogram; ECG) inhibit normal blood pressure
response and decrease blood pressure-related activity with insula and
pons while increasing activity in amygdala (relative to diastole). (A) Timing
of electrocutaneous stimuli relative to ECG R-wave: aiming to trigger at
systole around ECG T wave, and to trigger at diastole (immediate
presystole period). In fact for practical purposes stimulus events were
triggered in a predictive way from pulse oximetry data and the accuracy
of relationship to concurrently recording ECG confirmed post-hoc. (B)
Group data illustrating the differential effect of shock timing in cardiac
cycle on beat-to-beat mean arterial blood pressure responses across the
group. Systole was observed to attenuate blood pressure increase to
shock. (C–E) Group BOLD activity tracking blood pressure following
shock delivery was contrasted for events at systole vs. diastole. Activity
within C. bilateral insular cortex regions and D. dorsal brainstem (mid
pons) was greater at diastole compared to systole. E. Group activity in
right amygdala was greater at systole compared to diastole.
periaqueductal gray matter and amygdala (Gray et al., 2009b).
This study therefore provided evidence for integration across
viscerosensory, affective and autonomic systems within the brain
in response to a salient physical stimulus.
Using electroencephalography, to extend earlier knowledge
regarding baroreceptor influences on pain processing, Gray
and colleagues modulated participants’ expectation of painful
shock with visual cues. Early components of pain-evoked
potentials (e.g., N2) were not significantly affected by expectation
or systole/diastole timing. However, the magnitude of a
later component (P2, occurring around 400ms after shock
delivery and distributed across central and right lateral scalp
regions) differentiated between expected and unexpected shocks
presented at diastole. Baroreceptor activation (i.e., the timing of
stimuli at systole) abolished the difference between expected and
unexpected shock on this P2 component. This observation was
consistent with a simplemodel that suggests this later component
of pain processing is gated by attention, but furthermore
the operation of this attentional gate is conditional upon a
baroreceptor gate: i.e., signals from the heart and great vessels
exert their influence at an attention-dependent stage that follows
initial sensory mapping to brain (Gray et al., 2010). Thus, at least
for pain (and there is evidence for other sensory stimuli), natural
baroreceptor afferent effects on sensory processing appear to
occur at a secondary stage after initial sensory representation.
Of relevant interest, however, are the findings of a recent
magnetoencephalographic (MEG) study, which showed that the
magnitude of heartbeat evoked potentials (an index of cortical
representation of signals from the heart and great vessels) did in
fact predict whether or not a fine grained visual stimulus (low
resolution circular grating) entered conscious awareness (Park
et al., 2014). Nevertheless, this MEG study did not show a direct
effect of systole/diastole timing on stimulus detection.
Heartbeat Timing Effects on Emotional
Processing
The core observation that the processing of emotive (pain)
stimuli are modulated/gated by the cardiac cycle led to the
question as to whether other types of salient emotional stimuli
would be changed in value by these phasic cardiac afferent
signals. Emotional facial expressions have been widely used
in emotion research and affective neuroscience to probe and
engage brains systems. This approach has accommodated both
labeled line theories of specific discrete emotions (Ekman and
Friesen, 1971; Ekman and Cordaro, 2011) and more dimensional
constructionist views about emotional processing (Barrett, 2006).
Comparing the effects of presenting brief, but nevertheless overt,
pictures of different emotional faces at systole and diastole
demonstrated modest differences (c.1.5%) in subsequent heart
rate for disgust and happy stimuli, both showing greater slowing
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of heart rate to these facial expressions when processed at systole
compare to diastole. No significant effects were seen for sad and
neutral faces (Gray et al., 2012). Moreover for disgust expressions
there was also significant change in ratings of emotional
intensity (measured rather insensitively on a 5 point Likert
scale). This study was conducted during simultaneous brain
imaging with fMRI, which revealed an area of periaqueductal
gray matter whose activity mirrored the cardiac timing effect on
stimulus processing and negatively emotional predicted ratings.
Specifically for disgust, there was a similar convergent effect
within left mid orbitofrontal cortex (Gray et al., 2012). Thus,
phasic baroreceptor signals contribute to the processing of some
emotions, but it is noteworthy that this study did not examine
fear stimuli. This oversight was remedied in a further set of
studies, motivated by the possibility that the heart timing effect
may have the potential to differentiate and help people with
anxiety disorders and fear-related conditions such as phobia.
The observation of amygdala engagement in the pain study
also contributed to the motivation for a study similar to that of
Gray et al. (2012), but combining fMRI with the presentation
of fearful and neutral facial expressions at different phases of
the cardiac cycle (systole and late diastole). The presentation
of fear face stimuli at systole compared to diastole evoked
an enhancement of subjective perception of the emotion, with
reported intensity ratings changing by around 6%. A trend in
the opposite direction was noted for neutral faces, with intensity
ratings enhanced slightly at diastole. This effect of heart timing
on emotion perception was associated with bilateral engagement
of amygdala, the magnitude of which, particularly for the right
amygdala, correlated with individual differences in trait anxiety
levels (Garfinkel et al., 2014).
In the same set of investigations, a further effect was noted:
baroreceptor activation, (as inferred from timing stimuli at
systole) enhanced the detection of threat signals (fear faces)
but not of other emotions (Garfinkel et al., 2014). In a rapid
serial visual presentation (RSVP, attentional blink paradigm),
emotional faces presented among distracting masks (at the
border of conscious awareness) are more likely to ‘break through’
to conscious awareness. This “emotional attentional blink” effect
shows that salience of affect-laden stimuli grabs attention at
an early stage (Anderson and Phelps, 2001), an effect that
is abolished in amygdala lesioned participants (Anderson and
Phelps, 2001). In a behavioral study, timing emotional faces to
phases of the cardiac cycle, produced a significant facilitation
of this attentional grab for fear faces presented at systole
compared to diastole, but not for disgust, happy or neutral
faces (though notably there was a trend for detection of neutral
faces to be better at diastole). The magnitude of change was
noteworthy with around a 9% average shift in detecting fear
faces at systole compared to diastole. Interestingly, not all of
the healthy participants of the study demonstrated this average
effect: 3/19 people showed no differences between systole and
diastole for fear faces detection and, 2/19 showed small effects
in the opposite direction. At the other extreme, 3 people showed
25% or greater improvement in detection of fear faces at systole
(Garfinkel et al., 2014). This study on fear detection clearly
enriches the picture presented above regarding the impact of
heart signals on early sensory processing (Gray et al., 2009b;
Park et al., 2014). In summary, the cardiac timing effects
markedly and selectively influence the detection and emotional
appraisal for fear signals, at least for facial expressions. The
direction of these effects on fear processing is the opposite
of what had previously been the generally received wisdom
that baroreceptor afferent inputs are inhibitory to stimulus
processing, and the opposite of what is observed for the more
direct challenge of brief painful (electrocutaneous) stimuli. The
effects in the brain appear mediated through systems, notably
the amygdala, known to be engaged in threat processing and
its integration with afferent information regarding autonomic
arousal.
Conclusions and Future Research
The notion that states of autonomic arousal contribute
to emotional processing has a long history. Its relevance
is particularly noted in appraisal models of emotion and
incorporated into cognitive models of panic and anxiety.
Inspirational work in the 1970’s and 1980’s highlighted a
particular role of baroreceptor activation in conveying signals
to the brain about the state of cardiovascular arousal, beyond
its proximate role in the reflex control of blood pressure.
Heart timing experiments (reinforced by studies employing
external mechanical manipulation of baroreceptors) highlighted
inhibitory effects on processing of stimuli, notably the processing
of pain, as expressed in motor reflexes, electrocortical responses
and subjective judgments. Recent work, particularly from
our own laboratory, has highlighted opposite effects on the
processing of fear signals of potential threat, notable facial
expressions. Here baroreceptor activation facilitates the detection
of fear and augments the attribution of emotional salience.
Brain imaging of these effects has helped not only define the
levels of visceroaffective integration within brain, but imaging
has also identified objective markers and potential targets of
intervention since these same areas are typically implicated in
affective psychopathology, including the expression of anxiety
disorders. It is therefore a goal of future clinical research to
explore and exploit these observations. Fundamentally using
or manipulating afferent signals from the heart to enhance or
diminish the detection and processing of affective stimuli has
potential application for characterizing and stratifying patient
groups for different anxiolytic treatment, and may provide a
means of enhancing the interventions themselves, for example
by integrating physiological signals with computerized cognitive
behavioral therapies. More options may emerge as we learn more
about the neurochemistry and functional architecture supporting
these effects.
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